Fix Matrix E2EE: stop double-login and make cross-signing bootstrap reachable

Two bugs prevented Pete's device from ever cross-signing itself:

1. Double login / split-brain: New() did a manual mx.Login() AND set
   ch.LoginAs, so cryptohelper.Init() logged in a second time on a fresh
   crypto store, minting a separate device. device.json recorded one device
   while the olm account belonged to another, and every cold start leaked an
   orphan device. Pete's outgoing events were attributed to a device whose
   keys no client could verify. Removed ch.LoginAs (auth is already handled by
   the manual login + isTokenValid re-login path).

2. Unreachable bootstrap: the reset gate used
   IsDeviceTrusted(mach.OwnIdentity()), but OwnIdentity() hard-codes
   Trust=TrustStateVerified, so it always returns true and the bootstrap/reset
   branch was never entered. Replaced with GetOwnVerificationStatus(), which
   actually checks whether the current device key is signed by our
   self-signing key.
This commit is contained in:
prosolis
2026-06-05 11:35:29 -07:00
parent 0b94ce7fe5
commit 7b76f9ed23

View File

@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ import (
"log/slog" "log/slog"
"net/http" "net/http"
"os" "os"
"strings"
"path/filepath" "path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync" "sync"
"time" "time"
@@ -142,30 +142,45 @@ func New(cfg config.MatrixConfig) (*Client, error) {
"room", evt.RoomID, "event_id", evt.ID, "sender", evt.Sender, "err", err) "room", evt.RoomID, "event_id", evt.ID, "sender", evt.Sender, "err", err)
} }
// LoginAs enables the cryptohelper to re-login if the token expires // IMPORTANT: do NOT set ch.LoginAs here. We already performed an explicit
ch.LoginAs = &mautrix.ReqLogin{ // password login above (or restored a saved token), so mx is fully
Type: mautrix.AuthTypePassword, // authenticated against device.json's device. When LoginAs is set AND the
Identifier: mautrix.UserIdentifier{ // crypto store is fresh, cryptohelper.Init() performs a SECOND login
Type: mautrix.IdentifierTypeUser, // (StoreCredentials=true), minting a separate device and pinning the olm
User: cfg.UserID, // account to it — while device.json still records the first device. That
}, // split-brain is exactly the "device never verifies" bug: the device the
Password: cfg.Password, // token authenticates as is not the device the crypto account belongs to,
InitialDeviceDisplayName: cfg.DisplayName, // and each cold start leaks another orphan device. Token-expiry recovery is
} // already handled by the isTokenValid() check + re-login path above.
if err := ch.Init(context.Background()); err != nil { if err := ch.Init(context.Background()); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto helper init: %w", err) return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto helper init: %w", err)
} }
mx.Crypto = ch mx.Crypto = ch
// Bootstrap cross-signing only if not already set up. // Ensure our CURRENT device is cross-signed. We bootstrap (generate + upload
// fresh cross-signing keys, then self-sign) whenever either no keys exist yet,
// or keys exist on the server but our device is not signed by them. The latter
// is exactly the post-wipe state: when crypto.db is deleted the private
// self-signing key is lost (it is never persisted locally without an SSSS
// passphrase, and we discard the random recovery key), so the lingering server
// master key is useless to us and must be replaced.
//
// CRITICAL: do NOT gate this on IsDeviceTrusted(mach.OwnIdentity()).
// OwnIdentity() hard-codes Trust=id.TrustStateVerified, and ResolveTrustContext
// short-circuits on that, so the call is a tautology that ALWAYS returns true —
// it makes this branch unreachable and the device never gets signed.
// GetOwnVerificationStatus does a real check: is our own device key signed by
// our self-signing key?
mach := ch.Machine() mach := ch.Machine()
existingKeys, err := mach.GetOwnCrossSigningPublicKeys(context.Background()) hasKeys, deviceCrossSigned, err := mach.GetOwnVerificationStatus(context.Background())
if err != nil { if err != nil {
slog.Warn("cross-signing: failed to fetch existing keys", "err", err) slog.Warn("cross-signing: failed to check verification status", "err", err)
}
if !hasKeys || !deviceCrossSigned {
if hasKeys {
slog.Warn("cross-signing: keys exist but current device is not cross-signed, resetting cross-signing")
} }
if existingKeys == nil || existingKeys.MasterKey == "" {
_, _, err = mach.GenerateAndUploadCrossSigningKeys(context.Background(), func(ui *mautrix.RespUserInteractive) interface{} { _, _, err = mach.GenerateAndUploadCrossSigningKeys(context.Background(), func(ui *mautrix.RespUserInteractive) interface{} {
return map[string]interface{}{ return map[string]interface{}{
"type": mautrix.AuthTypePassword, "type": mautrix.AuthTypePassword,
@@ -195,7 +210,7 @@ func New(cfg config.MatrixConfig) (*Client, error) {
slog.Info("cross-signing: master key signed") slog.Info("cross-signing: master key signed")
} }
} else { } else {
slog.Info("cross-signing: already configured, skipping bootstrap") slog.Info("cross-signing: already configured and current device cross-signed, skipping bootstrap")
} }
slog.Info("E2EE initialized", slog.Info("E2EE initialized",