drwily/gogobee
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/prosolis/gogobee.git synced 2026-07-16 00:52:40 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

cross-signing: persist the bot's identity instead of reminting it every start

Browse Source 
Both session paths called GenerateAndUploadCrossSigningKeys unconditionally on
every start. That published a fresh cross-signing identity each time the bot
restarted, so every user's client saw the bot's verification break and had to
re-verify it. The freshly-minted recovery key was only ever logged, never kept,
so the identity couldn't be recovered either.

bootstrapCrossSigning now mints once, persists the recovery key to
DATA_DIR/cross_signing.json (0600), and on later starts reuses the stored
identity untouched. Two escape hatches, both normally unset:
CROSS_SIGNING_REGENERATE=1 forces exactly one remint (every user must then
re-verify), and CROSS_SIGNING_RECOVERY_KEY imports an identity created before
the bot persisted its own key.

Shared by the appservice and masdevice paths, which had drifted into two copies
of the same block.
This commit is contained in:
prosolis
2026-07-09 18:53:23 -07:00
parent ba7b20dfe5
commit 1adcd05dc7
5 changed files with 212 additions and 30 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

20
internal/bot/appservice.go
View File

@@ -137,23 +137,9 @@ func newAppserviceSession(cfg Config) (*Session, error) {
mach := ch.Machine()
// Best-effort cross-signing bootstrap so the bot's device shows as verified to
// users who trust its master key. Mirrors the masdevice path (client.go); the
// appservice path historically omitted it, so a fresh crypto.db has no
// cross-signing identity and the device shows unverified. Best-effort: under MAS
// the key upload may be refused, which we log and ignore — E2EE still functions.
if recoveryKey, _, err := mach.GenerateAndUploadCrossSigningKeys(ctx, func(ui *mautrix.RespUserInteractive) interface{} {
return map[string]interface{}{"session": ui.Session}
}, ""); err != nil {
slog.Warn("cross-signing: key upload skipped (may already exist or need UIA)", "err", err)
} else {
slog.Info("cross-signing: keys uploaded", "recovery_key", recoveryKey)
}
if err := mach.SignOwnDevice(ctx, mach.OwnIdentity()); err != nil {
slog.Warn("cross-signing: sign own device failed", "err", err)
}
if err := mach.SignOwnMasterKey(ctx); err != nil {
slog.Warn("cross-signing: sign master key failed", "err", err)
}
// users who trust its master key. Best-effort: under MAS the key upload may be
// refused, which we log and ignore — E2EE still functions without it.
bootstrapCrossSigning(ctx, mach, cfg.DataDir)
// Crypto plumbing that /sync would otherwise carry:
ep.OnOTK(mach.HandleOTKCounts)