071ea7b835d67b21a39f0ff6e7979c6f01517bf5
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Commits
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071ea7b835 |
Petal learns French, and the pack that shipped was misspelling itself
Phase 24, the fr half: langpack, Hunspell dictionary, Piper voice, and the lexicon coverage that turned out to have been measured already (63.1%, better than pt-PT's 62.1%). No migration; not deployed. The plan recorded that build_ptpt_dictionary.py "generalizes" to French. It did not. It handled single-character flags and plain PFX/SFX and stopped on everything else, and fr.aff uses four of the things it stopped on. FLAG long is the dangerous one: French flags are two characters, so the old reader's set(flagstr) yields a bag of unrelated letters and expands every entry through the wrong paradigm without ever erroring. Plus continuation flags (French really does affix an affixed form), NEEDAFFIX on 68,075 of 84,140 stems, and FULLSTRIP. Renamed build_hunspell_dictionary.py with a per-language profile, asserting that CIRCUMFIX and FORBIDDENWORD are still unused rather than assuming it — and it rebuilds pt-PT byte-identical to the shipped asset, which is the only thing that makes "generalized" a claim rather than a hope. Elision was decided by building both halves and measuring. Keeping l'arbre and its thirty-three siblings: 3,159,832 forms, 8.25 MB gzipped. Dropping them: 473,326 and 1.19 MB. They are not new words, but the tokenizer keeps internal apostrophes, so they genuinely would have been underlined — so they moved out of the dictionary into withElision, which splits at a known clitic and still requires the remainder to be a word (l'zzzz stays flagged). Real nspell: 369 ms and 74 MB, against pt-PT's 842 ms and 139 MB, on the larger language. Where the regional trap lives is the mirror image of Portuguese's: every fr_* Piper voice is fr_FR and Debian's fr_FR/fr_CA/fr_BE dictionaries are one shared word list, so nothing can be quietly wrong about the country and the whole decision sits in the copy. What French has instead is the 1990 reform, packaged three ways; comprehensive ships, because Petal never corrects her French and coût and cout are both correct. Then the interim review pass, at the user's suggestion and explicitly "for now": four models read each Latin pack independently, and only findings at least two of them reached on their own were applied — five per pack. It earned its keep on the pack that was already live. pt-PT was carrying pre-Acordo spellings (adjectivos, actualmente) in a file whose own header commits to post-Acordo, plus Brazilian decepção, because the Phase 21 greps checked for Brazilian vocabulary and never checked the pack against its own spelling policy. That grep now exists and was confirmed to fail on the old text before being kept. Where reviewers agreed a line was wrong but split on the fix, the wording is mine and the reasoning is in BUILD_PLAN rather than averaged away. Still owed, and both packs now say so precisely: a quorum of models agreeing is agreement, not authority. No native speaker has read either pack, and none of this has been seen in a browser. go build/vet/test clean, tsc, vite build, vitest 190/190. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016y6gyuHkQXPiEuW8RGQyua |
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1f4ca4775a |
Let her choose her own pair
Raised by the user, not by the plan: there was no way to change language in the mobile UI. There was no way anywhere. `users.pair_lang` has been readable since Phase 19 and writable by nobody — /api/me was GET-only and Upsert deliberately skips the column — which is also why "no pt-PT account exists yet" has stood through two phases. Nothing could create one. PATCH /api/me answers with the whole user rather than 204, so the client re-reads the pair from the server instead of trusting its own request. One write reaches everything: langpack, Hunspell dictionary, Piper voice, lexicon provider and prompt language all read the column at use time. The server refuses a pair it has no copy for, and auth.shippedPairs is deliberately not internal/llm's list. That one names pairs the prompts can talk about (fr and es, since Phase 19); this one names pairs Petal can render itself in, which needs a langpack. Storing fr today would strand her on Chinese with no way back except a lucky guess at a button she cannot read. The picker sits in the sidebar footer because the sidebar is the mobile drawer — always one tap away. The status bar exists only while a document is open, which is the wrong moment to find the app speaking a language you can't read. Each language names itself, 中文 and Português: the one place bilingual copy would get in the way. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016y6gyuHkQXPiEuW8RGQyua |
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6d71276513 |
Auth: pass the OIDC issuer through untouched, trailing slash and all
Deploying against the real Authentik turned this up immediately: its issuer ends in a slash, OIDC requires the discovered issuer to match the configured one byte-for-byte, and trimming it made discovery fail every time. The stub in the tests happened to advertise a slashless issuer, so the whole suite passed while the only provider Petal actually talks to could not be reached. The stub now takes its issuer as a knob, and a regression test runs the flow against one that ends in a slash. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016y6gyuHkQXPiEuW8RGQyua |
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1cf207d73f |
Phase 16: Petal authenticates for itself
Petal is now an OIDC client in its own right rather than trusting a header from the proxy. The Phase-0 Resolver seam was the only integration point: main.go picks the session store when Authentik is configured and the static local user otherwise, and no handler or query moved for either. internal/auth gains three pieces. session.go issues an opaque cookie token and stores only its SHA-256, so a database copy yields nothing usable; the 30-day expiry slides on every request, throttled to one write an hour, and logout deletes the row rather than just the cookie. oidc.go runs the authorization-code flow with state, nonce and PKCE, and discovers the provider lazily and on retry — an Authentik outage should block new logins without stopping Petal booting or invalidating live sessions. users.go provisions accounts from the token's claims and gates them on an allowlist that matches emails as well as subject ids, since a subject is an opaque uuid that doesn't exist until someone has already logged in once. Migration 0010 lands sessions, images and users.pair_lang together. The images table closes the capability-URL hole the Phase-0 audit flagged: a hash was previously enough to fetch anyone's picture. Rows are keyed (name, user_id) so one file can have several owners and deduplication survives; a stranger gets 404 rather than 403, the cache header drops to private, and files already on disk are claimed at startup or every image already pasted into a document would 404. On the frontend a single 401 interceptor feeds a warm bilingual sign-in overlay, drawn over a still-visible editor because nothing has been taken away. Behind it is the part that matters: a save that comes back 401 stashes its body to localStorage before anything else and stops the auto-save loop, and reopening that document after signing in merges the draft back and saves it. An expired session must not cost writing. Writing the round-trip test against a stub identity provider turned up a real bug: the one-shot state/nonce/PKCE cookies were cleared in a defer, which runs after the redirect has written the response header, so the clearing Set-Cookie was silently dropped and they lingered for their full ten minutes. Also swaps the emoji favicon for a drawn sakura, which renders as Petal's own rose palette everywhere instead of whatever each platform's font decides, and doubles as the app tile in Authentik. Migration 0010 verified against a VACUUM INTO copy of the live millenia database: counts intact, FTS still matching, the one existing image claimed. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016y6gyuHkQXPiEuW8RGQyua |
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6901cdbbe4 |
Multi-user groundwork: request-scoped user identity
Petal ran as a single hardcoded user, with db.LocalUserID named directly
at ~35 query sites. That made the caller's identity a compile-time
constant scattered across every package — nothing a real login could
replace without touching all of them.
New internal/auth moves it into the request context:
- Middleware(Resolver) resolves the caller once per API request
- handlers read auth.UserID(r.Context()) instead of naming a user
- Resolver is the seam an Authentik session check drops into
- StaticResolver(db.LocalUserID) keeps Petal single-user today
Behavior is unchanged. UserID returns "" rather than panicking when the
middleware is absent, so a mis-wired route fails closed: every query is
WHERE user_id = ?, which then matches nothing.
main.go splits /api into a public group (/health, /version) and an
authenticated group for everything else — a monitoring probe must not
need a session.
Two pre-existing access-control gaps fixed while threading, both
harmless with one user and not with two:
- setStatus (accept/dismiss) updated a suggestion by bare id with no
ownership check at all
- listForDoc/fetchPending read a document's suggestions by doc_id
alone; a suggestion quotes the sentence it corrects, so that leaked
the source prose
Both now scope through documents.user_id.
Tests: internal/auth covers the context round-trip, the absent-context
case, and both 401 paths. Two-user isolation suites in docs and
suggestions mount the same routers twice behind two resolvers over one
database and assert a stranger gets 404 on every id-taking path, sees
nothing in list/search, and leaves the owner's data untouched.
Those suites earned their keep immediately: docs.fetch gained a userID
parameter but kept binding db.LocalUserID in the query. Unused
parameters are legal Go, so it compiled clean, vet was silent, and every
existing test passed while the lookup stayed unscoped.
Still global, out of scope and flagged in BUILD_PLAN.md: the image store
has no per-user association, and frontend localStorage keys are
per-browser rather than per-account.
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