The mountpoint directory exists whether or not the encrypted volume is
mounted, so a boot where the unlock failed would start Petal against an
empty unencrypted directory and serve a blank database -- the failure
mode that looks like data loss. .volume-ok lives on the encrypted
filesystem and is bind-mounted with create_host_path:false, so its
absence is a container start failure instead of a silent empty DB.
Petal authenticates nobody yet -- StaticResolver hands every request the
same local user -- so on a public host the whole API is open: anyone who
finds the hostname can read and write documents and fill the disk with
image uploads. Traefik holds the door until the OIDC flow exists.
/api/health keeps its own higher-priority router with no middleware, so
the acceptance criterion (public health endpoint, reachable by the
monitoring on this box) still holds. Both the middleware and that router
are deleted when Phase 16 lands.
piper-tts 1.6.0 moved synthesis from POST / to POST /synthesize, with an
identical request body; the VPS sidecars run 1.6.0 and returned 405 to
every read-aloud request, while millenia's older server still expects /.
Rather than pinning both deployments to one Piper release, the path is
configuration -- default "/" keeps millenia working untouched, and the
compose stack sets /synthesize. The container healthcheck moves with it,
since it was probing the old route too.
The image's own petal user (uid 10001) has no claim on a bind-mounted
host directory, so SQLite came up with "unable to open database file
(14)" and the container restart-looped. Run as the stack directory's
owner instead of chowning ./data to 10001 -- the backup script gzips
snapshots in place from the host, so that account needs write access to
the same directory. Still non-root.
Deploy plumbing so Petal can run on the public VPS behind the Traefik
already on that box, with vLLM reached over headscale.
- Dockerfile: node build -> go build -> alpine runtime. CGO stays off
(modernc SQLite is pure Go), so the runtime layer exists only for
ffmpeg (read-aloud transcodes Piper's WAV) and tzdata (the companion's
bedtime nag and night mode read the local clock). Runs as uid 10001
with /data as the single writable mount.
- docker-compose.yml: Traefik labels following this host's convention
(external `traefik` network, `web-secure` entrypoint, `default` cert
resolver). Petal publishes no host port. ./data is a bind mount, not a
named volume, so the nightly backup and a restore are reachable from
the host.
- Piper runs as two sibling containers rather than host systemd units.
The plan assumed Piper was already installed on the VPS; it is not,
the host has no lingering user session to keep user units alive, and
containers keep the TTS ports on an internal network unreachable from
anywhere but Petal. One image, voice chosen per service, model cached
in a shared volume -- so the pt-PT voice is a new service, not a new
image.
- db.Backup + a `-backup` flag: VACUUM INTO, not a file copy. Petal runs
in WAL mode, so the newest committed pages may live in petal.db-wal;
copying the three files separately can capture a torn mid-checkpoint
state. VACUUM INTO reads one coherent snapshot without taking a write
lock, and emits a single file with no -wal/-shm companions. Refuses an
existing destination so a failed run can't destroy the last good
backup.
- deploy/backup-petal.sh: nightly snapshot, compress, push to millenia
over headscale with a post-transfer size check, prune both sides.
- deploy/petal.env.example: LLM_TIMEOUT raised 30s -> 90s for the
WAN+VPN round trip, since the voice and collocation passes send a
whole document and the timeout is a hard deadline on Complete.
prosolis