Deploying against the real Authentik turned this up immediately: its issuer
ends in a slash, OIDC requires the discovered issuer to match the configured
one byte-for-byte, and trimming it made discovery fail every time. The stub
in the tests happened to advertise a slashless issuer, so the whole suite
passed while the only provider Petal actually talks to could not be reached.
The stub now takes its issuer as a knob, and a regression test runs the flow
against one that ends in a slash.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016y6gyuHkQXPiEuW8RGQyua
Petal is now an OIDC client in its own right rather than trusting a header
from the proxy. The Phase-0 Resolver seam was the only integration point:
main.go picks the session store when Authentik is configured and the static
local user otherwise, and no handler or query moved for either.
internal/auth gains three pieces. session.go issues an opaque cookie token
and stores only its SHA-256, so a database copy yields nothing usable; the
30-day expiry slides on every request, throttled to one write an hour, and
logout deletes the row rather than just the cookie. oidc.go runs the
authorization-code flow with state, nonce and PKCE, and discovers the
provider lazily and on retry — an Authentik outage should block new logins
without stopping Petal booting or invalidating live sessions. users.go
provisions accounts from the token's claims and gates them on an allowlist
that matches emails as well as subject ids, since a subject is an opaque
uuid that doesn't exist until someone has already logged in once.
Migration 0010 lands sessions, images and users.pair_lang together. The
images table closes the capability-URL hole the Phase-0 audit flagged: a
hash was previously enough to fetch anyone's picture. Rows are keyed
(name, user_id) so one file can have several owners and deduplication
survives; a stranger gets 404 rather than 403, the cache header drops to
private, and files already on disk are claimed at startup or every image
already pasted into a document would 404.
On the frontend a single 401 interceptor feeds a warm bilingual sign-in
overlay, drawn over a still-visible editor because nothing has been taken
away. Behind it is the part that matters: a save that comes back 401
stashes its body to localStorage before anything else and stops the
auto-save loop, and reopening that document after signing in merges the
draft back and saves it. An expired session must not cost writing.
Writing the round-trip test against a stub identity provider turned up a
real bug: the one-shot state/nonce/PKCE cookies were cleared in a defer,
which runs after the redirect has written the response header, so the
clearing Set-Cookie was silently dropped and they lingered for their full
ten minutes.
Also swaps the emoji favicon for a drawn sakura, which renders as Petal's
own rose palette everywhere instead of whatever each platform's font
decides, and doubles as the app tile in Authentik.
Migration 0010 verified against a VACUUM INTO copy of the live millenia
database: counts intact, FTS still matching, the one existing image
claimed.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016y6gyuHkQXPiEuW8RGQyua
Petal ran as a single hardcoded user, with db.LocalUserID named directly
at ~35 query sites. That made the caller's identity a compile-time
constant scattered across every package — nothing a real login could
replace without touching all of them.
New internal/auth moves it into the request context:
- Middleware(Resolver) resolves the caller once per API request
- handlers read auth.UserID(r.Context()) instead of naming a user
- Resolver is the seam an Authentik session check drops into
- StaticResolver(db.LocalUserID) keeps Petal single-user today
Behavior is unchanged. UserID returns "" rather than panicking when the
middleware is absent, so a mis-wired route fails closed: every query is
WHERE user_id = ?, which then matches nothing.
main.go splits /api into a public group (/health, /version) and an
authenticated group for everything else — a monitoring probe must not
need a session.
Two pre-existing access-control gaps fixed while threading, both
harmless with one user and not with two:
- setStatus (accept/dismiss) updated a suggestion by bare id with no
ownership check at all
- listForDoc/fetchPending read a document's suggestions by doc_id
alone; a suggestion quotes the sentence it corrects, so that leaked
the source prose
Both now scope through documents.user_id.
Tests: internal/auth covers the context round-trip, the absent-context
case, and both 401 paths. Two-user isolation suites in docs and
suggestions mount the same routers twice behind two resolvers over one
database and assert a stranger gets 404 on every id-taking path, sees
nothing in list/search, and leaves the owner's data untouched.
Those suites earned their keep immediately: docs.fetch gained a userID
parameter but kept binding db.LocalUserID in the query. Unused
parameters are legal Go, so it compiled clean, vet was silent, and every
existing test passed while the lookup stayed unscoped.
Still global, out of scope and flagged in BUILD_PLAN.md: the image store
has no per-user association, and frontend localStorage keys are
per-browser rather than per-account.
prosolis