Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
prosolis 69bf3ffde1 Close the door the edge gate used to hold
A security review of the whole repo. The queries were already scoped, the
OIDC flow already did state and nonce and PKCE, the session tokens were
already stored as hashes. What it found was mostly the seam between the
code and the deployment — and one place where the deployment quietly
undid the code.

The one that matters: with any AUTHENTIK_* variable missing, Petal fell
back to resolving every request to the single `local` user. That is right
on a laptop and a catastrophe on a public host, and Phase 16 removed the
Traefik basic-auth gate that used to stand behind the mistake. A typo in
the client secret would have served her journals to the open internet and
said so only in a log line nobody reads. It now refuses to start, guarded
by default for any BASE_URL that isn't loopback.

Then the one that would have been fixed and wasn't: stored images now
serve under `default-src 'none'; sandbox`, so an SVG pasted into a
document can't run as a page on Petal's own origin. Traefik's
customresponseheaders *overwrites*, so the CSP declared in the compose
labels would have silently replaced that per-route policy in production.
The whole header block moved into the binary, where a route can tighten
its own and a test can prove it; only HSTS stays at the edge, where TLS
actually terminates.

The rest, smaller:

  - PETAL_ALLOWED_SUBS empty means everyone authentik authenticates, and
    authentik here fronts half a dozen applications. Still legal, now
    said out loud every boot, and set in both env examples.
  - LLM failures relayed err.Error() to the browser, which carries the
    address of the inference box on the far side of the VPN. Logged
    instead; the client only ever rendered "the helper is resting".
  - Exports scheme-check their links. Escaping makes a URL safe to sit
    in an attribute and says nothing about following it, and an export
    is the one artifact here meant to leave. Writing the test found the
    markdown image src, which I'd missed reading it.
  - The draft rescue is namespaced per account and cleared on sign-out.
    Everything else in localStorage is a preference; this is her unsaved
    writing, sitting in a profile two people share.
  - /auth/logout is POST-only. With SameSite=Lax a GET route lets any
    page on the internet sign her out mid-draft.
  - Image uploads get a per-account allowance and the TTS cache a size
    cap. Both share the encrypted volume the database is on, and a full
    disk is SQLite failing to write, not a feature degrading.
  - The session cookie takes the __Host- prefix over https, so nothing
    else under parodia.dev can plant one. Old cookies still resolve;
    nobody is signed out to get there.
  - npm audit: linkify-it and postcss.

Verified: go build, go vet, the full Go suite, tsc, 195 frontend tests,
npm audit clean. The startup guard and both CSPs checked against a
running server rather than only asserted.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016y6gyuHkQXPiEuW8RGQyua
2026-07-27 18:24:47 -07:00
prosolis 6901cdbbe4 Multi-user groundwork: request-scoped user identity
Petal ran as a single hardcoded user, with db.LocalUserID named directly
at ~35 query sites. That made the caller's identity a compile-time
constant scattered across every package — nothing a real login could
replace without touching all of them.

New internal/auth moves it into the request context:

  - Middleware(Resolver) resolves the caller once per API request
  - handlers read auth.UserID(r.Context()) instead of naming a user
  - Resolver is the seam an Authentik session check drops into
  - StaticResolver(db.LocalUserID) keeps Petal single-user today

Behavior is unchanged. UserID returns "" rather than panicking when the
middleware is absent, so a mis-wired route fails closed: every query is
WHERE user_id = ?, which then matches nothing.

main.go splits /api into a public group (/health, /version) and an
authenticated group for everything else — a monitoring probe must not
need a session.

Two pre-existing access-control gaps fixed while threading, both
harmless with one user and not with two:

  - setStatus (accept/dismiss) updated a suggestion by bare id with no
    ownership check at all
  - listForDoc/fetchPending read a document's suggestions by doc_id
    alone; a suggestion quotes the sentence it corrects, so that leaked
    the source prose

Both now scope through documents.user_id.

Tests: internal/auth covers the context round-trip, the absent-context
case, and both 401 paths. Two-user isolation suites in docs and
suggestions mount the same routers twice behind two resolvers over one
database and assert a stranger gets 404 on every id-taking path, sees
nothing in list/search, and leaves the owner's data untouched.

Those suites earned their keep immediately: docs.fetch gained a userID
parameter but kept binding db.LocalUserID in the query. Unused
parameters are legal Go, so it compiled clean, vet was silent, and every
existing test passed while the lookup stayed unscoped.

Still global, out of scope and flagged in BUILD_PLAN.md: the image store
has no per-user association, and frontend localStorage keys are
per-browser rather than per-account.
2026-07-26 21:42:37 -07:00
prosolis 8c6bc1604b Code-review follow-ups: httputil, validation caps, a11y
Backend:
- Extract shared internal/httputil (WriteJSON/ErrorJSON/BadRequest/
  ServerError); drop the triple-duplicated helpers in docs, suggestions,
  vocab. ServerError now logs the real error and returns a generic 500 so
  raw DB/internal errors never reach the client.
- vocab capture: validate doc_id ownership (blank -> none, unknown -> 400
  instead of a leaked FK 500); rune-safe clamp word/gloss/definition/
  phonetic/example.
- vocab review(): wrap the read-modify-write in a transaction (TOCTOU).
- /api request-size cap via MaxBytesReader middleware (2 MiB), exempting
  /api/images (own 10 MiB limit).

Frontend:
- StatusBar: drive the checking/voicing/collocating indicators from one
  array; llmDown uses !anyBusy.
- Slide-overs: new useFocusTrap hook (focus-in, Tab trap, focus-restore)
  on GardenPanel + HistoryPanel, both role=dialog/aria-modal/aria-label.
- speech.ts: export stopSpeech(); GardenPanel cancels audio on unmount.

Tests: add doc_id-validation and field-clamp coverage; full suite green.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016Yr6jELuRc7hyzYLccQKZd
2026-06-26 16:59:23 -07:00
prosolis 60eba25fee Phase 9: ESL superpowers — Chinese gloss + tone-rewrite
Inline Chinese gloss (offline) and a "say it more naturally" / tone-rewrite,
the two ESL features for the Mandarin-speaking writer.

Gloss: embedded English→Chinese dictionary (gloss.json.gz, 57k common words
built from ECDICT via scripts/build_gloss.py). lexicon gains Gloss()/Result.Gloss
and a lightweight GET /api/gloss/{word}; the right-click WordCard leads with the
中文; GlossTip shows it on a 350ms hover (reuses wordAt, so CJK is never glossed).
Offline + instant, works with the LLM down.

Rewrite: selecting text pops a SelectionBubble (更自然 + the tone vocabulary);
picking a style calls POST /api/docs/:id/rewrite (llm.RunRewrite, stateless,
owner-scoped) and shows a RewritePreview (original→rewrite, accept/cancel/retry).
Accept applies it in-editor.

Tests added in lexicon and suggestions. go build/vet/test, tsc, vite all clean;
live smoke vs a fake vLLM verified gloss + rewrite + 400/404/502 paths.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016Yr6jELuRc7hyzYLccQKZd
2026-06-26 00:07:26 -07:00