Let Authentik own forward-auth user emails; add forward-auth tests

For SSO users the email address is the IdP match key, so allowing them
to edit it in Veola orphaned the row on next sign-in. PostEmailPrefs now
keeps the synced Authentik email for forward users (only the deal-alert
and digest toggles stay editable); the settings form renders the field
read-only with a Managed by Authentik note. Local break-glass users keep
an editable field.

Add forward-auth integration tests over the full Routes() chain: trusted
proxy provisions an admin, untrusted peer's spoofed headers are ignored,
role re-syncs per request, and the email-prefs round trip confirms a form
cannot change a forward user's IdP email.
This commit is contained in:
prosolis
2026-06-20 11:26:02 -07:00
parent 7c95e4fd4e
commit 2fd4019103
4 changed files with 364 additions and 91 deletions

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@ import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -113,3 +115,220 @@ func TestLoginPageRenders(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("body missing <form>")
}
}
// ============ forward-auth (Authentik) integration ============
// Authentik header names, matching internal/config defaults.
const (
hdrEmail = "X-Authentik-Email"
hdrUsername = "X-Authentik-Username"
hdrName = "X-Authentik-Name"
hdrGroups = "X-Authentik-Groups"
)
// enableForwardAuth turns on forward-auth trust for the 10.0.0.0/8 range with
// admin group "veola-admins", mirroring a Traefik-in-front deployment.
func enableForwardAuth(t *testing.T, app *App) {
t.Helper()
fa, err := auth.NewForwardAuthConfig(hdrUsername, hdrEmail, hdrName, hdrGroups, "veola-admins",
[]string{"10.0.0.0/8"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewForwardAuthConfig: %v", err)
}
app.Auth.SetForwardAuth(fa)
}
// testClient threads cookies across requests so an scs session survives a
// GET-then-POST flow, and applies a fixed peer address + identity headers.
type testClient struct {
h http.Handler
remoteAddr string
headers map[string]string
cookies map[string]*http.Cookie
}
func newClient(h http.Handler, remoteAddr string, headers map[string]string) *testClient {
return &testClient{h: h, remoteAddr: remoteAddr, headers: headers, cookies: map[string]*http.Cookie{}}
}
func (c *testClient) do(method, target string, form url.Values) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
var req *http.Request
if form != nil {
req = httptest.NewRequest(method, target, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
} else {
req = httptest.NewRequest(method, target, nil)
}
if c.remoteAddr != "" {
req.RemoteAddr = c.remoteAddr
}
for k, v := range c.headers {
req.Header.Set(k, v)
}
for _, ck := range c.cookies {
req.AddCookie(ck)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
c.h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
for _, ck := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
c.cookies[ck.Name] = ck
}
return rec
}
var csrfRe = regexp.MustCompile(`name="csrf_token" value="([^"]+)"`)
func extractCSRF(t *testing.T, body string) string {
t.Helper()
m := csrfRe.FindStringSubmatch(body)
if m == nil {
t.Fatal("no csrf_token field in body")
}
return m[1]
}
func TestForwardAuthProvisionsAdminFromTrustedProxy(t *testing.T) {
app, h := newTestApp(t)
enableForwardAuth(t, app)
c := newClient(h, "10.0.0.5:5555", map[string]string{
hdrEmail: "ada@example.com",
hdrUsername: "ada",
hdrGroups: "users|veola-admins",
})
rec := c.do(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200 (provisioned dashboard); body: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
u, err := app.Store.GetUserByEmail(context.Background(), "ada@example.com")
if err != nil || u == nil {
t.Fatalf("GetUserByEmail: u=%v err=%v", u, err)
}
if u.Role != models.RoleAdmin {
t.Errorf("role = %q, want admin (from veola-admins group)", u.Role)
}
if u.AuthSource != "forward" {
t.Errorf("auth_source = %q, want forward", u.AuthSource)
}
}
func TestForwardAuthUntrustedPeerIgnoresSpoofedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
app, h := newTestApp(t)
enableForwardAuth(t, app)
// Same headers, but the direct peer is NOT in the trusted range: the
// headers must be ignored and no user provisioned.
c := newClient(h, "203.0.113.9:5555", map[string]string{
hdrEmail: "mallory@example.com",
hdrUsername: "mallory",
hdrGroups: "veola-admins",
})
rec := c.do(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 303 (no trust, setup gate)", rec.Code)
}
if loc := rec.Header().Get("Location"); loc != "/setup" {
t.Fatalf("Location = %q, want /setup", loc)
}
if u, _ := app.Store.GetUserByEmail(context.Background(), "mallory@example.com"); u != nil {
t.Fatalf("spoofed header provisioned a user: %+v", u)
}
}
func TestForwardAuthReSyncsRoleOnEveryRequest(t *testing.T) {
app, h := newTestApp(t)
enableForwardAuth(t, app)
admin := newClient(h, "10.0.0.5:5555", map[string]string{
hdrEmail: "bea@example.com",
hdrGroups: "veola-admins",
})
if rec := admin.do(http.MethodGet, "/", nil); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("first request status = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
}
u, _ := app.Store.GetUserByEmail(context.Background(), "bea@example.com")
if u == nil || u.Role != models.RoleAdmin {
t.Fatalf("after admin login, role = %v, want admin", u)
}
// IdP later drops the admin group: the next request must downgrade the role.
demoted := newClient(h, "10.0.0.5:5555", map[string]string{
hdrEmail: "bea@example.com",
hdrGroups: "users",
})
if rec := demoted.do(http.MethodGet, "/", nil); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("second request status = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
}
u, _ = app.Store.GetUserByEmail(context.Background(), "bea@example.com")
if u == nil || u.Role != models.RoleUser {
t.Fatalf("after group drop, role = %v, want user", u)
}
}
func TestForwardAuthEmailPrefsRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
app, h := newTestApp(t)
enableForwardAuth(t, app)
// A forward-auth session authenticates without local login; carry its
// cookie + CSRF token into the POST.
c := newClient(h, "10.0.0.5:5555", map[string]string{
hdrEmail: "cleo@example.com",
hdrGroups: "users",
})
rec := c.do(http.MethodGet, "/settings", nil)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("GET /settings = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
}
token := extractCSRF(t, rec.Body.String())
provisioned, _ := app.Store.GetUserByEmail(context.Background(), "cleo@example.com")
if provisioned == nil {
t.Fatal("forward user not provisioned by GET /settings")
}
// A forward user can toggle opt-ins, but a form that tries to change the
// email must be ignored: the address is the Authentik match key, so
// changing it here would orphan the row on the next sign-in.
form := url.Values{
"csrf_token": {token},
"email": {"cleo+spoofed@example.com"},
"email_deal_alerts": {"1"},
"email_weekly_digest": {"1"},
}
rec = c.do(http.MethodPost, "/settings/email", form)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("POST /settings/email = %d, want 200; body: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
// Email is unchanged (still the IdP address), so the row still re-matches.
u, err := app.Store.GetUserByEmail(context.Background(), "cleo@example.com")
if err != nil || u == nil {
t.Fatalf("forward user orphaned: GetUserByEmail(IdP addr) u=%v err=%v", u, err)
}
if u.ID != provisioned.ID {
t.Errorf("re-matched a different row: id %d != %d", u.ID, provisioned.ID)
}
if u.Email != "cleo@example.com" {
t.Errorf("email = %q, want the unchanged IdP address cleo@example.com", u.Email)
}
if !u.EmailDealAlerts || !u.EmailWeeklyDigest {
t.Errorf("opt-ins = (deal:%v digest:%v), want both true", u.EmailDealAlerts, u.EmailWeeklyDigest)
}
// The user appears in the deal-alert recipient list under their IdP address.
recips, err := app.Store.UsersWithDealAlerts(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UsersWithDealAlerts: %v", err)
}
if !containsEmail(recips, "cleo@example.com") {
t.Errorf("deal-alert recipients %v missing cleo", recips)
}
}
func containsEmail(us []models.User, email string) bool {
for _, u := range us {
if u.Email == email {
return true
}
}
return false
}

View File

@@ -108,6 +108,13 @@ func (a *App) PostEmailPrefs(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
email := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue("email"))
// Forward-auth (Authentik) owns the address: it is the IdP match key, kept
// in sync on every request. Never overwrite it from the form, or the next
// sign-in would no longer match and orphan the row. Users change their
// email in Authentik; only the opt-in toggles are editable here.
if cur.AuthSource == "forward" {
email = cur.Email
}
dealAlerts := r.PostFormValue("email_deal_alerts") == "1"
weeklyDigest := r.PostFormValue("email_weekly_digest") == "1"