veola/internal/auth/auth.go

package auth

import (
	"context"
	"crypto/hmac"
	"crypto/rand"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"crypto/subtle"
	"database/sql"
	"encoding/hex"
	"errors"
	"net/http"
	"time"

	"github.com/alexedwards/scs/sqlite3store"
	"github.com/alexedwards/scs/v2"
	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"

	"veola/internal/db"
	"veola/internal/models"
)

const (
	BcryptCost     = 12
	MinPasswordLen = 12

	sessionUserIDKey = "user_id"
	sessionCSRFKey   = "csrf_token"

	csrfFormField  = "csrf_token"
	csrfHeaderName = "X-CSRF-Token"
)

// Manager bundles session manager + DB store and serves as the auth surface.
type Manager struct {
	Sessions *scs.SessionManager
	Store    *db.Store
	hmacKey  []byte
	// forward, when non-nil, enables trust of reverse-proxy identity headers.
	// See forward.go.
	forward *ForwardAuthConfig
}

func NewManager(sqlDB *sql.DB, store *db.Store, sessionSecret string, secureCookies bool) (*Manager, error) {
	if len(sessionSecret) < 32 {
		return nil, errors.New("session secret too short")
	}
	sm := scs.New()
	sm.Store = sqlite3store.New(sqlDB)
	sm.Lifetime = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
	sm.IdleTimeout = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
	sm.Cookie.Name = "veola_session"
	sm.Cookie.HttpOnly = true
	sm.Cookie.Path = "/"
	sm.Cookie.SameSite = http.SameSiteLaxMode
	sm.Cookie.Persist = true
	// Secure must be set whenever the browser-facing connection is HTTPS,
	// which includes running behind a TLS-terminating proxy. Resolved from
	// config; defaults to true there.
	sm.Cookie.Secure = secureCookies

	mac := sha256.New()
	mac.Write([]byte(sessionSecret))
	return &Manager{Sessions: sm, Store: store, hmacKey: mac.Sum(nil)}, nil
}

func HashPassword(plain string) (string, error) {
	b, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(plain), BcryptCost)
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	return string(b), nil
}

func CheckPassword(hash, plain string) bool {
	return bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(hash), []byte(plain)) == nil
}

// dummyHash is a valid bcrypt hash of a throwaway value. It exists only so a
// login attempt for a non-existent user can still run a real bcrypt
// comparison, equalizing response time and closing the user-enumeration
// timing oracle.
var dummyHash, _ = bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte("veola-timing-equalizer"), BcryptCost)

// EqualizeLoginTiming performs a bcrypt comparison against a throwaway hash so
// that a missing username costs roughly the same wall-clock time as a wrong
// password. Call it on the no-such-user branch of login.
func EqualizeLoginTiming() {
	_ = bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword(dummyHash, []byte("veola-timing-equalizer-x"))
}

// LogIn writes the user id into the session and rotates the token.
func (m *Manager) LogIn(ctx context.Context, userID int64) error {
	if err := m.Sessions.RenewToken(ctx); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	m.Sessions.Put(ctx, sessionUserIDKey, userID)
	m.Sessions.Put(ctx, sessionCSRFKey, newCSRFToken())
	return nil
}

func (m *Manager) LogOut(ctx context.Context) error {
	return m.Sessions.Destroy(ctx)
}

func (m *Manager) UserID(ctx context.Context) int64 {
	return m.Sessions.GetInt64(ctx, sessionUserIDKey)
}

func (m *Manager) CurrentUser(ctx context.Context) (*models.User, error) {
	id := m.UserID(ctx)
	if id == 0 {
		return nil, nil
	}
	return m.Store.GetUserByID(ctx, id)
}

// ============ CSRF ============

func newCSRFToken() string {
	b := make([]byte, 32)
	if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
		// extremely unlikely; fall back to a time-based token rather than crashing
		return hex.EncodeToString([]byte(time.Now().String()))
	}
	return hex.EncodeToString(b)
}

func (m *Manager) CSRFToken(ctx context.Context) string {
	tok := m.Sessions.GetString(ctx, sessionCSRFKey)
	if tok == "" {
		tok = newCSRFToken()
		m.Sessions.Put(ctx, sessionCSRFKey, tok)
	}
	return tok
}

// CSRFFieldName is the HTML form field expected by the middleware.
func CSRFFieldName() string { return csrfFormField }

// ============ Middleware ============

type ctxKey int

const (
	ctxKeyUser ctxKey = iota
)

func userFromContext(ctx context.Context) *models.User {
	u, _ := ctx.Value(ctxKeyUser).(*models.User)
	return u
}

// CurrentUserFromRequest is the public accessor for handlers and templates.
func CurrentUserFromRequest(r *http.Request) *models.User {
	return userFromContext(r.Context())
}

// LoadUser populates the user into the context for any logged-in session.
// Routes still need RequireAuth/RequireAdmin to gate access.
func (m *Manager) LoadUser(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		u, err := m.CurrentUser(r.Context())
		if err == nil && u != nil {
			ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxKeyUser, u)
			r = r.WithContext(ctx)
		}
		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	})
}

// RequireAuth redirects to /login if no user is present. Skips /login, /setup,
// /static. The setup-gate (redirect to /setup if no users exist) is applied
// at the router level via SetupGate so it can short-circuit before auth runs.
func (m *Manager) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		if userFromContext(r.Context()) == nil {
			http.Redirect(w, r, "/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
			return
		}
		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	})
}

func (m *Manager) RequireAdmin(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		u := userFromContext(r.Context())
		if u == nil {
			http.Redirect(w, r, "/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
			return
		}
		if u.Role != models.RoleAdmin {
			http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
			return
		}
		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	})
}

// CSRFProtect validates the CSRF token on non-idempotent requests.
func (m *Manager) CSRFProtect(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		switch r.Method {
		case http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead, http.MethodOptions:
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
			return
		}
		expected := m.Sessions.GetString(r.Context(), sessionCSRFKey)
		if expected == "" {
			http.Error(w, "csrf token missing from session", http.StatusForbidden)
			return
		}
		got := r.Header.Get(csrfHeaderName)
		if got == "" {
			if err := r.ParseForm(); err == nil {
				got = r.PostFormValue(csrfFormField)
			}
		}
		if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(got), []byte(expected)) != 1 {
			http.Error(w, "invalid csrf token", http.StatusForbidden)
			return
		}
		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	})
}

// HMAC is exposed for non-session use cases (e.g. signed setup links). Not
// currently called by handlers but kept available since the secret is loaded.
func (m *Manager) HMAC(payload []byte) string {
	h := hmac.New(sha256.New, m.hmacKey)
	h.Write(payload)
	return hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil))
}