Files
Pete/internal/web/auth_test.go
prosolis cb84e1d549 games: a news session that travels to the games box
preferred_username was being read from the ID token and thrown away after
serving as a display-name fallback. It is the whole identity story: MAS imports
it as the Matrix localpart, so it is also who the player is in the euro economy.
Keep it in the session, and derive @user:server from it.

The session cookie was host-only, so a sign-in on news never reached games.
Widen it with an opt-in web.auth.cookie_domain — but only the session cookie:
the OAuth round-trip cookie pairs with a redirect back to the host that started
the login and stays where it was set. And because the redirect must return to
that host, the redirect_uri is now derived per-request for hosts inside the
cookie domain, with the configured URL as the fallback for anything else — a
Host header we don't own is never echoed into a redirect.
2026-07-13 23:04:09 -07:00

154 lines
4.8 KiB
Go

package web
import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"golang.org/x/oauth2"
)
func TestSignVerifyRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
a := &Authenticator{secret: []byte("test-secret-key-at-least-16")}
payload := []byte(`{"sub":"abc","exp":123}`)
tok := a.sign(payload)
got, ok := a.verify(tok)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("verify rejected a freshly signed token")
}
if string(got) != string(payload) {
t.Fatalf("payload mismatch: got %q want %q", got, payload)
}
}
func TestVerifyRejectsTamperAndForeignKey(t *testing.T) {
a := &Authenticator{secret: []byte("test-secret-key-at-least-16")}
tok := a.sign([]byte(`{"sub":"abc"}`))
// Flip a byte in the payload segment.
bad := []byte(tok)
bad[0] ^= 0x01
if _, ok := a.verify(string(bad)); ok {
t.Error("verify accepted a tampered token")
}
// A different key must not validate the same token.
other := &Authenticator{secret: []byte("a-totally-different-key-16")}
if _, ok := other.verify(tok); ok {
t.Error("verify accepted a token signed with a different key")
}
if _, ok := a.verify("not-a-valid-token"); ok {
t.Error("verify accepted a malformed token")
}
}
func TestSafeNext(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]string{
"": "/",
"/tech": "/tech",
"/tech?page=2": "/tech?page=2",
"//evil.com": "/", // protocol-relative open redirect
"https://evil.com": "/", // absolute URL
"javascript:alert": "/", // not a path
}
for in, want := range cases {
if got := safeNext(in); got != want {
t.Errorf("safeNext(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
}
}
}
func TestMatrixUser(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
u SessionUser
want string
}{
{"lowercased", SessionUser{Username: "Reala"}, "@reala:parodia.dev"},
{"trimmed", SessionUser{Username: " reala "}, "@reala:parodia.dev"},
{"old session with no username", SessionUser{Sub: "abc", Name: "Reala"}, ""},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := tc.u.MatrixUser("parodia.dev"); got != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("MatrixUser = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
}
})
}
if got := (&SessionUser{Username: "reala"}).MatrixUser(""); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("no server name should yield no identity, got %q", got)
}
}
func TestHostInDomain(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
host, domain string
want bool
}{
{"games.parodia.dev", ".parodia.dev", true},
{"news.parodia.dev:8080", ".parodia.dev", true},
{"parodia.dev", ".parodia.dev", true},
{"GAMES.PARODIA.DEV", ".parodia.dev", true},
{"evil.com", ".parodia.dev", false},
// The suffix check must not match a domain that merely ends in the
// same letters: notparodia.dev is a different site entirely.
{"notparodia.dev", ".parodia.dev", false},
{"games.parodia.dev.evil.com", ".parodia.dev", false},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
if got := hostInDomain(tc.host, tc.domain); got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("hostInDomain(%q, %q) = %v, want %v", tc.host, tc.domain, got, tc.want)
}
}
}
func TestOAuthForKeepsLoginOnTheHostItStartedOn(t *testing.T) {
base := &oauth2.Config{RedirectURL: "https://news.parodia.dev/auth/callback"}
a := &Authenticator{oauth: base, domain: ".parodia.dev"}
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/auth/login", nil)
req.Host = "games.parodia.dev"
if got := a.oauthFor(req).RedirectURL; got != "https://games.parodia.dev/auth/callback" {
t.Fatalf("games login should come back to games, got %q", got)
}
req.Host = "news.parodia.dev"
if got := a.oauthFor(req).RedirectURL; got != base.RedirectURL {
t.Fatalf("news login should use the configured URL, got %q", got)
}
// A Host we don't own must never be echoed back into a redirect URI.
req.Host = "evil.com"
if got := a.oauthFor(req).RedirectURL; got != base.RedirectURL {
t.Fatalf("foreign host must fall back to the configured URL, got %q", got)
}
// With no cookie domain configured there is nothing to share, so the
// configured redirect stands whatever the Host header says.
off := &Authenticator{oauth: base}
req.Host = "games.parodia.dev"
if got := off.oauthFor(req).RedirectURL; got != base.RedirectURL {
t.Fatalf("host-only mode must not rewrite the redirect, got %q", got)
}
}
func TestSessionCookieIsSharedButOAuthCookieIsNot(t *testing.T) {
a := &Authenticator{secret: []byte("test-secret-key-at-least-16"), domain: ".parodia.dev"}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.setCookie(rec, sessionCookie, "v", time.Minute)
a.setCookie(rec, oauthCookie, "v", time.Minute)
got := map[string]string{}
for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
got[c.Name] = c.Domain
}
if got[sessionCookie] != "parodia.dev" {
t.Fatalf("session cookie domain = %q, want it shared across parodia.dev", got[sessionCookie])
}
if got[oauthCookie] != "" {
t.Fatalf("oauth cookie must stay host-only, got domain %q", got[oauthCookie])
}
}