Files
petal/docker-compose.yml
T
prosolis e2f967c92b Deploy: drop the interim basic-auth gate now that Petal signs people in
The gate existed because Petal authenticated nobody and a public hostname
was therefore a public, writable API. It no longer is: every /api route
answers 401 without a session, so the only thing an anonymous visitor
reaches is the app shell and its redirect to Authentik. The separate
unauthenticated /api/health router goes with it — it only existed to escape
the middleware. A second password in front of a real login is one more
thing to lose.

Also records the two problems this deployment actually hit, since both fail
before the login page appears and neither is obvious from the error: the
issuer's trailing slash is significant, and a provider created through the
API rather than the admin UI comes up with an empty grant_types.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016y6gyuHkQXPiEuW8RGQyua
2026-07-27 07:33:01 -07:00

134 lines
5.5 KiB
YAML

# Petal on the parodia.dev VPS.
#
# docker compose up -d --build
#
# Fronted by the host's existing Traefik (external `traefik` network, the
# `web-secure` entrypoint and the `default` cert resolver — same convention the
# other services on this box use). Petal itself never binds a host port; the
# only way in is through Traefik over HTTPS.
#
# Read-aloud runs as two sibling containers rather than host systemd services:
# each Piper HTTP server loads exactly one voice, the host has no lingering
# user session to keep systemd units alive, and keeping them on the internal
# network means the TTS ports are unreachable from anywhere but Petal.
#
# Copy deploy/petal.env.example to .env before the first `up`.
name: petal
services:
petal:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: Dockerfile
image: petal:local
container_name: petal
restart: unless-stopped
# ./data is a bind mount, so the image's own `petal` user (uid 10001) has no
# claim on it — the host's ownership wins and the container can't open
# petal.db. Run as whoever owns the stack directory instead. Keeping it the
# host user (rather than chowning ./data to 10001) is deliberate: the backup
# script gzips snapshots in place from the host, so the host account needs
# write access to the same directory. Still never root.
user: "${PETAL_UID:-1001}:${PETAL_GID:-1001}"
env_file: .env
environment:
# Fixed by the image layout; kept here so they're visible at a glance.
PORT: "8080"
DATABASE_PATH: /data/petal.db
IMAGE_DIR: /data/images
TTS_CACHE_DIR: /data/tts
# Piper sidecars. Each server loads one voice, so English and Chinese are
# separate containers; the handler maps language → instance from config.
TTS_ENDPOINT: http://piper-en:5000
TTS_ENDPOINT_ZH: http://piper-zh:5000
# The sidecars run piper-tts 1.6.0, which serves synthesis on
# /synthesize; millenia's older server keeps the default "/".
TTS_PATH: /synthesize
# The companion's bedtime nag and night mode read the local clock.
TZ: ${TZ:-Europe/Lisbon}
volumes:
# A bind mount, not a named volume: petal.db must be trivially reachable
# from the host for the nightly backup and for a restore.
- ./data:/data
# Mount-liveness guard. On the VPS ./data is an encrypted LUKS volume, and
# the mountpoint directory still exists when that volume is NOT mounted —
# so without this, a boot where the unlock failed would start Petal
# against an empty unencrypted directory and quietly serve a blank
# database. .volume-ok lives on the encrypted filesystem, and
# create_host_path: false turns its absence into a container start
# failure instead. Harmless elsewhere: create the file once and it is a
# no-op. See deploy/README.md §6.
- type: bind
source: ./data/.volume-ok
target: /data/.volume-ok
read_only: true
bind:
create_host_path: false
networks:
- traefik
- internal
depends_on:
- piper-en
- piper-zh
labels:
traefik.enable: "true"
traefik.docker.network: traefik
traefik.http.routers.petal.rule: Host(`${PETAL_HOST:-petal.parodia.dev}`)
traefik.http.routers.petal.entrypoints: web-secure
traefik.http.routers.petal.tls: "true"
traefik.http.routers.petal.tls.certResolver: default
traefik.http.routers.petal.service: petal
# No edge gate: Petal authenticates for itself now (Authentik OIDC), so
# every /api route answers 401 without a session and the only thing served
# to an anonymous visitor is the app shell and its sign-in redirect. The
# basic-auth middleware that stood here until Phase 16 — plus the separate
# unauthenticated router /api/health needed to escape it — is gone; a
# second password in front of a real login is just one more thing to lose.
traefik.http.routers.petal.middlewares: compression@file,petal-headers
traefik.http.services.petal.loadbalancer.server.port: "8080"
# Petal is a private writing space: no framing, no sniffing, HSTS on.
traefik.http.middlewares.petal-headers.headers.customresponseheaders.Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self'
traefik.http.middlewares.petal-headers.headers.customresponseheaders.Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
traefik.http.middlewares.petal-headers.headers.customresponseheaders.X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
traefik.http.middlewares.petal-headers.headers.customresponseheaders.Referrer-Policy: same-origin
piper-en:
build:
context: deploy/piper
image: petal-piper:local
container_name: petal-piper-en
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
PIPER_VOICE: ${TTS_VOICE_EN:-en_US-amy-medium}
volumes:
- piper-voices:/voices
networks:
- internal
piper-zh:
build:
context: deploy/piper
image: petal-piper:local
container_name: petal-piper-zh
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
PIPER_VOICE: ${TTS_VOICE_ZH:-zh_CN-huayan-medium}
volumes:
- piper-voices:/voices
networks:
- internal
networks:
# Created and owned by the host's Traefik stack.
traefik:
external: true
# Petal ↔ Piper only. Not reachable from the internet or the other stacks.
internal:
driver: bridge
volumes:
# Downloaded voice models, shared read-mostly by both Piper instances so the
# same model is never fetched twice.
piper-voices: